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Introduction 
The internationalization of state-owned companies has become a prominent phenomenon 
in the global economy. Although developed countries mostly decided to privatize their state 
companies, governments of emerging economies not only retained them, but urged such 
companies to go international. State multinationals invest abroad to receive knowledge, 
technological and managerial capabilities, brands and other strategic assets they lack. One of the 
most important assets they seek are natural resources, hydrocarbons in particular. This was one 
of the reasons why state enterprises in the oil&gas sector – national oil companies -  were 
established. Other reasons - strategic importance of the sector for country economy, desire to 
maximize rent - urged government to nationalize assets of foreign companies or build national 
oil champions from scratch.   
National oil&gas companies go abroad to secure stable supplies through acquisitions of 
upstream assets if their home country lacks them, or to keep up with international competition 
and become a global player. They are increasingly important players in the global oil&gas 
markets. In particular, national oil companies possess the absolute majority of proved oil 
reserves and more than half of undiscovered reserves. Moreover, they account for three-fourths 
of global crude oil production. Thus, the understanding of their internationalization patterns is 
essential for both oil&gas researchers, as well as for industry players.  
However, the general theory was initially developed to explain the internationalization of 
privately owned companies from developed counties. As such, it misses important idiosyncrasies 
of state multinationals, such as distinct kind of firm-specific advantages, other strategic intents 
and location preferences. To overcome this drawback, scholars have developed a specialized 
internationalization theory for state-owned multinational companies from emerging markets. It 
helped to address issues not covered by general theory by taking into consideration the effects of 
state ownership and weak institutional environment context in the emerging markets. 
At the same time, a separate stream of research is dedicated to the study of national oil 
companies. Scholars have thoroughly investigated the reasons behind the establishment of 
national oil champions. Also, the comparison of state and private oil companies efficiency is a 
major point for discussion. As regards internationalization, the researchers have focused on firm-
specific, or ownership advantages – access to capital lending at below market rates, information 
support from government, state political backing and experience of operating in an uncertain 
environment, stemming from their origin in emerging markets. Researchers have also pointed at 
the ‘national purpose’ of state oil companies – the set of non-commercial goals, which change 
market based decision making patterns. This set is defined by the government and can include a 
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broad range of goals – bilateral trade promotion, geopolitical power projection or national energy 
security enhancement.  
One particular part of internationalization process of state oil companies – internalization 
– have received scarce attention. In particular, ownership level choice in a foreign subsidiary is 
one of the most important strategic decisions in internationalization because it determines the 
reward a company would get, as well as the amount of risk it has to bear. It is a well-established 
fact in the literature that choosing the right level of participation determines long-term viability 
and success of a joint venture (or a wholly-owned subsidiary). Coupled with the role of national 
oil companies in the industry and global economy, it means, that the understanding of this aspect 
of internationalization is essential for academic theory and industry professionals. At the same 
time, one of the factors that influence the choice of ownership in a foreign subsidiary is state 
participation in a company equity capital, as established by the researchers of state 
multinationals. 
Hence, the purpose of this paper is to identify the influence of state ownership on the 
level of participation in foreign upstream projects of oil companies. Upstream sector comprises 
exploration, development and production projects of oil&gas reserves, i.e. it includes activities 
from the initial search for resources to their extraction. This paper concentrates on the upstream 
sector because its capital and technological intensity makes it one of the most difficult types of 
foreign investments and differentiates it from other sectors (Cheon 2015). To achieve this goal 
the following objectives should be met: 
• Identify the differences in the internationalization of state and privately owned 
oil&gas companies according to the eclectic paradigm 
• Establish the applicability of state-owned multinational companies literature 
findings to national oil companies in regard to participation level choice in foreign 
subsidiaries 
• Test the influence of state ownership on the level of participation in foreign 
subsidiaries using two different specifications – linear and logistic regression 
This paper is structured according to these objectives. We start by looking at the three 
dimensions of eclectic paradigm – ownership, location and internalization advantages, and 
explaining how the framework is usefully complemented by bundling theory of foreign market 
entry modes. Next, the comparison of state and privately owned oil companies 
internationalization is provided in all three dimensions of the eclectic paradigm with an aim to 
demonstrate the difference between two types of oil companies, especially at the third part of the 
model – internalization – as it comprises subsidiary ownership level choice. In this way, we 
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demonstrate that general theory needs adjustments to explain strategic choices of state oil 
companies in regard to the level of participation in their projects abroad.  
Next, we show the relevance of literature on state-owned companies to national oil 
companies by looking at their distinctive features. We then move to the discussion of findings on 
internationalization of state companies, particularly in regard to internalization advantages. It is 
then coupled with emerging markets context – a separate theory was already generalized for 
state-owned multinational from developing countries. Thus, using the empirical evidence (for all 
state enterprises) on the influence of government ownership on company internalization 
decisions, a proposition is developed about the same process in the oil&gas industry. It is 
empirically tested using two types of regression on a sample of foreign upstream subsidiaries of 
25 leading oil&gas companies according to Platts global ranking. Finally, empirical research 
results are interpreted using state enterprises theory, as well as practical relevance is explained. 
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1. Internationalization of oil&gas companies in the context of state 
ownership and emerging market specifics 
This chapter will proceed as follows. First, we will look at the relevant theories of 
internationalization process for oil&gas industry, namely, the OLI parading and bundling model 
of foreign markets entry, as well as how they complement each other in determining the level of 
ownership in foreign subsidiaries. 
Next, the comparison of state and privately owned oil&gas companies 
internationalization will be made according to the three blocks of the eclectic paradigm. In 
addition, the specifics of internationalization in the upstream sector will be explained. By doing 
so, we will show how internationalization of state-owned oil companies differs from what is 
predicted by the general theory.  
After that, we will justify the relevance of state-owned enterprises literature to national 
oil companies by looking at the shared features of both types of companies. As soon as the link is 
established, we will move to the description of the literature on multinational state-owned 
enterprises from emerging markets. First, description of relevant research of state companies 
from emerging markets and national oil companies internationalization will be provided to 
highlight important findings and emphasize what is left to be investigated. Next, we will show 
how findings on state multinationals from emerging markets can be used to explain the specific 
features of national oil companies in regard to internalization process. Building on that, the 
proposition regarding subsidiary ownership level choice will be made. 
 
1.1 Review of relevant internationalization theory frameworks 
Internationalization strategies have received ample attention from international business 
scholars, but for this research eclectic theory (or OLI paradigm) was chosen for two main 
reasons (Dunning 1988; Dunning and Lundan 2008). First, it is one of the most influential 
theories in this field, that can be applied to different industries and rationales of expansion (for 
application check Dunning 1998). Second, this theory captures several stages in the process: the 
decision to internationalize, location choice, specific entry mode choice. The latter stage is not 
very much covered by eclectic theory, but it can and will be usefully complemented by Hennart 
bundling model. 
According to the OLI framework, companies choose to invest abroad if a combination of 
three types of advantages is present: 
1. Ownership – a company possess transferable across its facilities firm-specific 
advantages, which give it market power, such as skills, know-how, products, etc. 
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2. Location – the company can benefit from establishing operations in a particular 
country because the latter have country-specific advantages, which differentiate it 
from a home country (low-cost labor, natural resources, etc.). 
3. Internalization – the company will benefit from conducting operations in this country 
internally, rather than organizing them in the market (contracting products and 
services). 
In the upstream segment of oil&gas industry, companies have ownership advantages 
because of capital and technological intensity, countries have location advantages due to the pre-
determined geological formation of hydrocarbon reserves, while the character of company-level 
capabilities and assets they seek requires internalization of activities. 
Thus, firms choose to establish operations abroad instead of exporting products if their 
ownership advantages can be best realized when complemented with location-specific 
advantages of foreign countries, rather than home location. They also decide to conduct activities 
internally if it is hard to transfer ownership advantages, there is a risk to lose them, to reduce 
agency costs, or to gain access to a strategic asset. 
 In the context of the upstream oil&gas industry, it means that companies have to invest 
abroad to gain access to hydrocarbon reserves, which they can exploit with benefit by using their 
capabilities, technologies and capital investments. 
One notable exception is those oil&gas companies, which are situated in countries with 
vast hydrocarbons endowment and demonstrate no intention or need to internationalize, such as 
Iranian and Nigerian national oil companies. These companies are out of the scope of this 
research paper for the exact reason that they do not invest abroad. 
 Further, firms have ownership advantages, such as managerial skills, technological 
expertise, access to capital or ability to operate in a weak institutional environment. At the same 
time, governments and local partners have very strong location advantages due to the nature of 
hydrocarbon reserves. Therefore, even if foreign investors prefer to conduct operations without 
other parties via a wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS), the exact form of entry mode to another 
country is often a subject of bargaining (Vernon 1971). 
In order to establish which factors contribute to this bargaining process, foreign entry 
model of Anderson and Gatignon will be used to understand the decision-making process on the 
part of an entrant. It will then be complemented by bundling model of foreign market entry 
(Hennart 2009). Although there are several other prominent frameworks of market entry mode 
determinants, Hennart model provides the most comprehensive view of the local market 
conditions.  
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According to a theoretical framework designed by Anderson and Gatignon, companies 
decide on how to enter a foreign market in terms of the desired level of control. Control is used 
as a proxy for the risk tolerance and target return – two determinant of strategic long-term 
decisions. The degree of control a firm wants in a foreign subsidiary depends on three constructs 
(the fourth one – brand – is of lower importance to the oil&gas industry): specificity of assets for 
a transaction, external and internal uncertainty (Anderson and Gatignon 1986). For instance, in 
the case of an international oil company (IOC)1 entering a foreign country, asset specificity will 
be high, because it provides its technological expertise, specialized for the industry, as well as 
management skills, which cannot be applied in a broader range of natural resource extraction 
sectors. Such company would also have a low level of internal uncertainty because of the well-
established management systems, high understanding of its mature product and experience in 
international operations. External uncertainty will depend on the specific country it decides to 
enter – level of risk, regulatory environment, political system. 
Thus, for Anderson and Gatignon the level of control, and as a consequence a decision 
between WOS, JV and the stake in the latter, is a tradeoff between risk and return. This tradeoff 
depends on the assets an entrant contributes, ability to control its agents abroad and country risk. 
Using this determinants, it is possible to decide on the level of participation a company should 
pursue in a foreign market. However, using only this model would limit the choice of the level of 
participation to a unanimous decision of an entrant. For this reason, it will be complemented with 
bundling theory. 
Hennart’s bundling theory takes into consideration both entrant firm needs and target 
market conditions, as well as the incumbent local firm needs. It also fits well with OLI paradigm 
and specifies its internalization dimension. Bundling framework builds on the transaction cost 
theory of the firm and in essence, is an extension of it in a foreign country setting. According to 
the transaction cost theory, all activities can theoretically be organized through market. There are 
costs associated with this way of performing operations, called transaction costs. They arise 
because to organize an activity in the market it is necessary to find relevant information, bargain 
for conditions and enforce a contract. However, not all contingencies can be put into a contract. 
Firms exist because they can reduce transaction costs by organizing processes internally, which 
allows combining activities more efficiently and facilitate information flow (Williamson 1985). 
A firm will expand until costs of performing an activity internally will not be equal to doing the 
same through the market (Perman and Scouller 1999). 
Hennart uses transaction cost theory to explain the specific choice of foreign market entry 
mode. As in the OLI paradigm, he states that in order for a foreign investor to exploit its 
                                                          
1 IOC – large multinational oil company with minority or no state ownership (Stevens 2008) 
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ownership (firm-specific) advantages, they need to be bundled with local complementary assets 
– locational advantages. The form this bundle takes, i.e. level of equity ownership of the entrant 
– WOS, equity JV, licensing –  is determined simultaneously by the intentions of the entrant and 
local owners of complementary assets. Thus, this form of bundling assets is an equilibrium of 
their choices (Hennart 1988; Hennart 2009).  
However, those choices are determined by the transaction costs, associated with the 
specific type of assets. Table 2 below provides an overview of equilibria resulting from different 
coincidences of transaction costs.  
 
Table 1. Optimal mode of foreign market entry (Hennart 1988). 
 
Assets held by an entrant 
Easy to transact Difficult to transact 
 
 
Complementary 
assets held by local 
owners 
 
Easy to transact 
 
1.  Indeterminate 
 
3. WOS of an entrant 
 
Difficult to transact 
2. Wholly owned 
operations of local 
firm/licensing 
4. Join ventures 
between an entrant 
and local firm 
 
Columns of the table represent transaction costs for the market entrant to organize 
activities through market, i.e. sell its assets. If the costs are low, an entrant company could 
provide the assets under certain conditions (if they are easily tradable). For instance, brand is a 
tradeable asset, which can be used in franchising. In this case, transaction costs for the local 
company are high because building a brand requires time and effort – that is why this situations 
ends up at cell 2 – licensing (franchising).  
The next section explains why assets of entering oil&gas companies are difficult to 
transact and licensing is not an option for their internationalization, but for now we will discuss 
only the implications of this to narrow the scope - only cells 3 and 4 are relevant. The exact 
outcome depends on the market conditions in a target market. If it is hard to obtain (transact 
though market) complementary resources on the local market, then, everything else held equal, 
an entrant would prefer wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS). Otherwise, it will establish an equity 
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joint venture (EJV). To make it clear, ease of transaction means the tradability of an assets – to 
what extent it can be provided/acquired by another party on the contractual basis though market. 
Both WOS and EJV can take the form of acquisition or greenfield, e.g. and EJV can be a 
new legal entity (greenfield), or a partial acquisition of a stake in an existing entity with an aim 
to form a joint venture. According to Hennart, the way WOS or EJV will be formed depends on 
the market conditions. 
Specifically, the same assets can be obtained in the three different markets: market for 
assets (purchase), services of assets (rent), firms (acquisitions; all subsequently referred to as 
‘local markets’). If the transaction costs in one of the markets are high, economic agent can turn 
to the others (Hennart 2009).  
 
Table 2. Determinants of equity level in a foreign subsidiary (Hennart 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If asset and asset service markets are inefficient, then these assets are embedded in firms 
and cannot be accessed in disembodied form. To get these assets, a foreign entrant has to turn to 
the firms market. If this market is inefficient as well, i.e. the costs of finding and acquiring firms 
are high or it is legally restricted, then an entrant has to start a greenfield EJV with a local 
partner, which will provide the necessary assets. 
Markets for assets and asset services 
are relatively inefficient? 
No 
Wholly owned 
greenfield 
Yes 
Efficient market for firms? 
No 
Greenfield EJV 
Yes 
Efficient integration? 
Full acquisition 
Yes 
No 
Partial acquisition EJV 
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In the upstream oil&gas segment it means, that a piece of land/offshore zone with subsoil 
hydrocarbon resources (oil block or field) can be obtained in the asset market by purchasing it. If 
this market is inefficient for some reasons, such as legislative restrictions, it can be obtained in 
the asset service market, which means renting. Finally, a foreign investor can turn to the market 
for firms and acquire a license holder (company) for this oil block. The process is described in 
table 3. 
If the firms market is efficient, an entrant can acquire either the whole firm or a stake in it 
(everything else held equal). The decision is determined by the efficiency of integration of 
potential acquisition, which depends on two factors: modularity of assets and incentive loss. 
Modularity represents the degree to which desired assets can be disentangled from other assets, 
so that these can be sold. Incentive loss refers to the motivation of local employees and 
management – the importance of it and the amount of decrease. If efficient integration is 
possible, then an entrant will pursue full integration. Otherwise, it will acquire a stake in a local 
firm, which then converts to an EJV. In this way, an entrant can either get access to only the 
desired assets or prevent incentive loss (Hennart 2009).  
An important theoretical implication of this model is that there is no reason to apply the 
term ‘equity joint venture’ to only new legal entities. Both greenfield EJVs and partial 
acquisitions have the same incentives structure and efficiency properties (Hennart 2009).  Thus, 
for the purposes of this study, term EJV will refer to both types without distinction, and the term 
WOS will refer both to greenfield projects and full acquisitions.  
Integration of approaches of Dunning, Hennart, Anderson and Gatignon allows creating a 
comprehensive understanding of how the level of participation in a foreign subsidiary is 
determined. Company decides to establish a subsidiary abroad if its firms-specific (ownership) 
advantages can be best exploited by combining them with country-specific (location) advantages 
through internal operations.  
Depending on the level of external and internal uncertainty, as well as assets transaction 
specificity of this firm, it decides on the desired level of control. The characteristics of the 
entrant’s assets in terms of transaction costs are matched with those of local complementary 
assets. The level of equity participation is then determined by the interaction of the entrant’s 
desire for control and the efficiency of local markets of complementary assets. Thus, the 
outcome of this theoretical model depends on the following inputs: characteristics of an entrant 
assets and of local complementary assets, efficiency of local markets, internal and external 
uncertainty for the entrant.  
In the next section this theoretical framework will be applied to the upstream sector to 
achieve two objectives: emphasize specificity of internationalization strategies in the upstream 
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oil&gas sector in general, and examine the different FDI decisions international and national oil 
companies make. In this way, we will identify those features of national oil companies 
internationalization, that cannot be explained by the general theory revised in this section. 
 
1.2 Comparison of oil&gas companies internationalization in the upstream sector 
In this section we will look at the application of internationalization theory to upstream 
oil&gas in the following way. The section is divided into three paragraphs, each dedicated to a 
part of OLI framework. Inside each paragraph we will first look at the specifics of a set of 
advantages in the upstream oil&gas in general, and then compare differences between national 
oil companies (NOC)2 and international oil companies (IOC) strategies. The determinants of the 
level of participation (mode of entry) in a foreign project will be analyzed in the last paragraph 
dedicated to internalization advantages. 
Ownership. In terms of ownership advantages, foreign investor usually brings a broad 
range of firm-level capabilities – those, that can be transferred and applied across projects and 
geographies, encouraging horizontal integration (Navaretti and Venables 2004). For IOCs these 
are management skills, technological expertise, and availability of capital.  
Management skills refer to a long experience of managing the entire value chain in the 
oil&gas – from exploration to production, refining, transportation and marketing activities. More 
relevant aspect to this study is ability to manage large and multi-stage production processes and 
properly apply new technologies, often available only to majors, in the upstream projects. It 
creates an important ownership advantage in negotiations with partners with little or no 
experience in the industry and in managing large-scale long-term projects (Henderson and 
Ferguson 2014). IOCs also have an access to global capital markets. It gives them an advantage 
in times of low oil prices (McKern 1993). 
In contrast, NOCs are not on the technological edge in comparison with IOCs (although 
this parameter varies significantly among national companies). Managerial skills often do not 
represent their advantage either. Nevertheless, they still manage to internationalize using a set of 
alternative ownership advantages. In particular, researchers found out, that governments often 
supplies NOCs with cheap capital and provides political backing. Governments do so, because 
NOCs are used to pursue political goals, enhance bilateral trade, or promote energy security. 
These two factors allows NOCs to participate in projects, unavailable to IOCs, or outbid them 
(Buckley et al. 2007). 
                                                          
2 NOC – oil company with majority state ownership (Wolf 2009) 
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In particular, Chinese NOCs – Sinopec, CNPC, CNOOC – work in very close 
cooperation with the government to improve energy security because of the high dependency of 
the country on foreign oil supplies. For instance, CNPC got the right of first refusal on four oil 
blocks in Nigeria with high potential in exchange for the Chinese government commitment to 
invest in the expansion of  local refinery. This kind of resource diplomacy helped Chinese NOCs 
to secure oil&gas assets in Sudan, Algeria, Tunisia, Angola and other countries. The cooperation 
of state and state companies is so close, that it causes negative publicity for those companies in 
countries-recipients of FDI (Paik et al. 2007). 
A similar approach is used by Indian state oil companies. The typical way of cooperation 
is a NOC-NOC agreement with a resource-rich country, backed by Indian government financial 
support in the form of credits for unspecified goals. For instance, an agreement between ONGC 
Videsh and Ghana’s NOC was supported with Indian government loan to Ghana government in 
the amount of 60 million dollars, half of which was used to repair presidential palace in Ghana.  
Similar agreements allowed Indian NOCs to secure assets in Nigeria and Sudan (Paik et al. 
2007). 
Korean oil company – KNOC – has articulated national mission. The company declares 
promotion of energy diplomacy with a focus on Russian, Africa, and Central Asia, increase in 
state financial support for overseas oil investments and enhancement of energy security among 
its direct goals. KNOC has also secured oil block in Nigeria in exchange for a loan from Korean 
to Nigerian government (Paik et al. 2007). Similar examples of promotion of non-commercial 
goals by NOCs and close cooperation of government and oil companies can be found in other 
countries, but this brief overview provides a perspective on the degree of such cooperation. It 
allow NOCs to compensate for a relative disadvantage in terms of managerial skills and 
technological expertise. 
Location. As for the locational advantages, these form the most important part of the OLI 
framework in the upstream sector due to a number of reasons. The first reason is that 
hydrocarbon reserves are distributed unequally around the world. It means that oil&gas 
companies have to invest in countries where these reserves are present (table 1). Another reason 
is the non-renewable and even depleting nature of oil&gas resources  (McKern 1993). As a 
result, companies in this industry are in constant quest for replacing reserves. This factor is 
reinforced by the fact, that oil&gas companies would have to rely on their competitors supply if 
they do not secure enough resources, which is not a viable option in the long term. Apart from 
that, hydrocarbon reserves differ in quality, quantity and the amount of investment required to 
extract them. This means that on a global scale oil&gas companies compete for the same 
resource deposits.  
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One notable exception is those companies, which are situated in countries with vast 
hydrocarbons endowment and demonstrate no intention or need to internationalize, such as 
Iranian and Nigerian national oil companies. These companies are out of scope of this research 
paper for the exact reason that they do not invest abroad. 
These geographical and geological factors provide strong locational advantages to the 
government of rich in hydrocarbon reserves countries, which they clearly understood and 
became adept to exploit (Henderson and Ferguson 2014). 
 
Table 3. Global distribution of crude oil reserves3 (Heritage Foundation 2017; US EIA 2016). 
Country Crude oil proved reserves 
(billion barrels), rounded 
Economic Freedom 
Index 
Strength of 
institutions 
Venezuela 300 25,2 Very low 
Saudi Arabia 266 59,6 Low 
Canada 169 77,7 High 
Iran 158 50,9 Low 
Iraq 142 N/A Very low 
Kuwait 102 62,2 Moderate 
UAE 98 77,6 High 
Russia 80 58,2 Low 
Libya 74 N/A Very low 
United States 39 75,7 High 
Nigeria 37 58,5 Low 
Kazakhstan 30 69,1 Moderate 
Qatar 25 72,6 High 
Brazil 13 51,4 Low 
Algeria 12 44,7 Very low 
Angola 8 48,6 Very low 
Ecuador 8 48,5 Very low 
Mexico 8 64,8 Moderate 
Azerbaijan 7 64,3 Moderate 
 
                                                          
3 Similar distribution applies to gas reserves 
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In particular, the allocation of exploration and production licenses may be restricted to 
foreign companies either for separate, large oilfields, or dependent on special conditions, such as 
creating a joint venture with a local company and subsequent knowledge sharing. State 
authorities claim that hydrocarbon reserves have strategic importance, and, therefore, have to be 
under strict control. Indeed, resource-rich countries often rely heavily on royalties and taxes of 
oil&gas industry to fund state budget. Additional restrictions and regulations allow to extract 
more rent from this sector and prevent dependency on foreign companies (Henderson and 
Ferguson 2014). For instance, hydrocarbons development in Russian Arctic offshore is restricted 
to state-owned companies and foreign investors can only participate in joint ventures (JV). 
Another Russian federal law restricts foreign investments in particular large-scale oilfields (Law 
on Investments in Strategic Assets 2014; Law on Subsoil 1992; Pomeranz 2010). 
An important implication of immutability of geographical distribution of reserves is that 
oil&gas companies must invest in countries with those resources despite the quality of 
institutional environment, which is one of the most important factors in FDI decisions. In the 
oil&gas industry, this factor has a much less significance. Countries in table 1 possess 95% of 
proved world hydrocarbon reserves, meaning that companies have to invest in some of them. 
Consistent with the literature, Economic Freedom Index was used to assess the strength of 
institutions in those countries. The index is a robust composite measure of 12 quantitative and 
qualitative factors, including the rule of law, government and regulatory efficiency, market 
openness. It can be seen from the table that the majority of countries with rich hydrocarbon 
endowment have low quality of institutions, which makes it harder to invest in these markets. In 
fact, there are only 4 countries with favorable business conditions, but they account for roughly 
one-fifths of proven reserves. As a result, oil&gas companies have to invest in countries with 
low quality of institutions.   
Researchers have identified, that there is a difference in search for locational advantages 
between NOCs and IOCs. Buckley et al. (2007) have found empirical evidence to the fact that 
NOCs invest relatively more in exploration project, than production. According to the paper, the 
reason is that NOC is typically concerned more with energy security of its home countries and 
for this reason invests in untapped oil and gas field at the phase of exploration. In contrast, IOCs 
are more interested in short-term value maximization, which makes them invest more in in 
production project that can bring value faster. Moreover, NOCs are ready to pay more for 
discovered fields for the same reason – promotion of national energy security in the future. 
Internalization. The third element of the paradigm – internalization – means, in the 
context of the oil&gas industry, that companies need to engage in projects abroad by themselves, 
instead of subcontracting their activities to other parties, due to several reasons.  
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The first reason is that firm ownership advantages cannot be easily transferred to a third 
party. On the one hand, transfer of knowledge such as managerial skills (for IOCs) requires high 
transaction costs because it is embedded in the company itself. For NOCs, it would be cheap 
state funding and political ties – also non-transferable assets. IOCs also have to protect these 
ownership advantages, which is not always possible due to incomplete contracts issue 
(Henderson and Ferguson 2014). On the other hand, oil&gas companies have to engage in 
upstream projects to recover depleted resources base (internalize hydrocarbon reservoirs) and 
add new oilfields to their balance sheet. This is one of the pillars of oil&gas companies business 
strategy and subcontracting development projects to another company would undermine it 
(Stevens 2016). Finally, companies often want to engage in overseas operations to reduce agency 
costs, which can arise when foreign subcontractor distorts information about the market and its 
own operations (Navaretti and Venables 2004). 
To sum up, firms choose to establish operations abroad instead of exporting products if 
their ownership advantages can be best realized when complemented with location specific 
advantages of foreign countries, rather than home location. They also decide to conduct activities 
internally if it is hard to transfer ownership advantages, there is a risk to lose them, or to reduce 
agency costs.  
The specificity of the application of this internationalization framework in oil&gas sector 
is determined by special emphasis on location advantages and internalization of processes. The 
nature of hydrocarbon reserves - unequal distribution, non-recoverable character, unequal quality 
- makes companies invest in locations where these resources are present, often despite the 
institutional environment in host countries. Moreover, high transaction costs of transferring firm-
specific advantages and the need to constantly recover reserves or locate downstream operations 
close to consumers force oil&gas companies to internalize processes. FDI flow in the industry is 
also constrained by the level of importance host governments assign to its reserves.  
There are also differences between internationalization of IOCs and NOCs. Private 
companies possess managerial skills and technological expertise, while national companies enjoy 
capital with below market rates, and make use of government political ties. They also prefer to 
invest in fields in exploration phase.  
One sphere where scholars have not yet explained the differences between the two types 
of oil companies is the ownership level choice in foreign upstream projects. In the next two 
sections it will be shown, that there is an opportunity to do so by applying findings of 
internationalization theory of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to NOCs. To justify this 
opportunity to close this research gap, we will first explain the similarity between NOCs and 
SOEs, and then examine what does internationalization theory of SOEs suggests. The review of 
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the origins of SOEs and NOCs in the next section is also necessary to explain why this new 
branch of internationalization theory is necessary by looking at distinct features of state 
companies. 
 
1.3 Characteristics of national oil companies as a major type of state-owned enterprises 
In order to understand how state participation alters strategic choices (the level of foreign 
subsidiary ownership being one of the most important of such decisions) the rationale behind 
state ownership of companies should be understood. 
There are two ways of justifying the creation of SOE: economic and political ones, which 
are often intertwined. Economic explanation stems from the existence of market failures that 
may prevent the use of resources in the economy for the increase of public wealth. There are 
several types of such failures: negative externalities, when firms do not have to compensate for 
them (such as environmental pollution); information asymmetries,  incomplete markets 
(consumers cannot buy products even if they can afford it), depletion of public goods, and cases 
for the creation of natural monopolies. The latter can result in higher prices, lower quality and 
other negative effects, unless properly monitored (Lawson 1994). Government chooses among 
several ways to correct market failures. It can additionally tax certain types of activities, subside 
other kinds of operations to promote them, impose regulations or decide to provide goods or 
services by itself, which would result in the creation of SOE (Laffont and Tirole 1993). 
Another line of justification of SOEs is widely spread in the oil&gas sector – political 
arguments. There are four types of them: nationalistic, strategic, social, communistic. The first 
one -  economic nationalism - also have different approaches, which all assume the strategic 
importance of certain industries. One approach is that government needs to be in charge of 
‘commanding heights’  - industries with important linkages in the economy. The reason is that 
according to this argumentation private sector cannot organize large-scale projects, which are 
necessary for economic development. Therefore, government should create SOE to speed up 
national development (Vernon 1971). Another approach considers the need for import 
substitution to reduce the power of both foreign companies and domestic private enterprises in 
key industries (Bruton 1998). In close connection to nationalistic view is an argument in favor of 
national defense, according to which some industries declared to be strategically important for 
national security. Finally, social argument states that market forces cannot achieve welfare for all 
categories of population. Therefore, government should create SOE to promote it in the spheres 
such as healthcare, education, combating poverty (Cuervo-Cazzura, et al. 2014). It will be shown 
that some of those argument are widely used to justify actions and strategic goals of oil&gas 
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companies with state ownership, which influences both conditions of countries-recipients of FDI 
and internationalization decisions of oil&gas companies. 
National oil companies constitute one of the most important types of SOEs in global 
economy (Cheon 2015). Today NOCs account for more than 75% of world crude oil production, 
possess 60% of undiscovered oil reserves and 90% proved reserves (similar numbers apply to 
gas and liquids). Out of 25 world top oil companies, 18 are NOCs (Tordo, Tracy and Arfaa 
2011). These numbers indicate high importance of NOCs for the global economy and 
governments. 
This role led to a special attention paid to the oil&gas industry, often directly via state 
ownership. This level of control allows government to force NOCs to pursue a non-commercial 
set of goals, which can be in general referred to as “national purpose” -  efficient oversight, 
socioeconomic issues, ideology, foreign and domestic political goals (Khan 1987).  
The first part of this purpose is monitoring enhancement of the petroleum industry. 
Proponents of this argument claim, that when a ‘middleman’ – private companies – is engaged in 
the operations in oil&gas industry, government exists in information asymmetry situation. This 
means, that private companies are much better informed about geological appraisal results, 
technical specifics, costs and environmental impact of operations. Government either does not 
have enough expertise to efficiently monitor the industry, or starts to lose it. The creation of 
NOC allows resolving this asymmetry by providing state with first-hand information through 
operational involvement (Stevens 2004). 
Another part of national purpose is an ideological one. NOCs are often viewed as 
symbols of national sovereignty in developing countries, which is an echo of the dominance of 
IOCs from developed countries before 1970-is. This is one of the reasons why foreign 
investments are restricted in oil&gas sector to a partnership with local NOCs – to prevent 
neocolonialism and support sovereignty (Stevens 2004; Linde 2000).  
Further, increasing petroleum rent is still important for NOCs. In general, higher rent in 
the upstream and value-added in the downstream can be captured by a properly designed fiscal 
and contractual framework, which can promote both rent maximization and long-term growth of 
the industry (Tordo 2007). However, it is often the case that developing countries do not have 
enough expertise to design and implement these frameworks. A logical way to solve this issue is 
to create NOC, which will replace the need for regulation.  
 Socioeconomic goals are often an important part of national mission. This category 
includes varying objectives depending on the country needs, but in general can include creation 
of employment opportunities, maintaining social infrastructure (schools, hospitals, etc.), 
subsidizing fuel prices for local economy (especially in net oil importing countries), 
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infrastructure development (roads, bridges, etc.). NOCs can serve as a substitute for a social 
safety net if public facilities are underdeveloped. These goals can be achieved through direct 
provision by a company and lead to a redistribution of wealth, or through subsidizing separate 
funds (McPherson 2003; Horn 1995).  
Final, and the most relevant to this study, part of NOC national mission comprises 
political gains. State control of an oil company can generate political power both inside and 
outside the country. Domestically, all the socioeconomic decisions – employment, social 
infrastructure, subsidies – significantly influence lives of voters (McPherson 2003). NOC is also 
a powerful force in controlling local petroleum industry. Outside of the country, it can be used to 
pursue goals of foreign policy and national security: promoting bilateral trade, securing fuel 
supplies, obtaining political or military support and others. 
To sum up, NOC is one of the most important types of SOEs. Government control often 
results in “double bottom line”, when NOCs have to pursue both commercial goals and 
objectives of a national purpose. The latter may include a broad range of objectives, such as 
foreign political goals. These distinctive features of SOEs led earlier researchers to the 
conclusion, that companies of this type are unlikely to internationalize (overview of these 
arguments and recent counterarguments at Cuervo-Cazzura 2018). First, investing abroad were 
seen as a loss to a national economy. For this reason, SOEs were encouraged to use local 
resources, employ people at home country and invest locally even if it led to higher costs or 
lower efficiency. As a result, the research predicted that SOEs would be reluctant to invest in 
stable presence abroad or change their products for foreign markets. In this case, exporting 
would be a better option. Second, SOEs are more inflexible institutions relative to privately-
owned multinational companies. The implications of the latter factor include strong preference 
for long-term contracts (and working with foreign SOEs), and inability to keep up with the pace 
of innovations in certain industries. Finally, SOEs might be unable to compete in foreign markets 
because they do not possess necessary ownership advantages, while at home they enjoy a special 
preferential regime. 
However, since the liberalization of outward investment regulations and growth of 
emerging economies in 1990-2000-s internationalization of SOEs have rapidly become a 
widespread phenomenon in world economy. Thus, researchers have found several possible 
explanations, that present counterarguments to previous research (Cuervo-Cazzura 2018). On the 
one hand, SOEs were found to be heterogenous in some aspects. Some of them operate in 
inherently domestic industries, such as alcohol beverages production monopoly. Others were 
created to internationalize and provide home country with natural resource. Another identified 
factor was the importance of state policy. The internationalization process of a SOEs is very 
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much determined by restrictions or incentives created by home government. In particular, the 
absence of traditional ownership advantages can be an exact reason for internationalization – 
government may encourage its SOEs to invest in developed countries to develop or acquire these 
advantages. Thus, SOEs have a number of specific traits, that influence their FDI decisions. This 
will be analyzed in more detail in the next section. 
 
1.4 Internationalization idiosyncrasies of emerging market SOEs  
and recent empirical research findings 
General frameworks of firm FDI decisions discussed in the first section of this chapter 
were originally developed to explain the behavior of privately owned multinational companies 
from developed countries. However, due to a number of distinctive traits of SOEs, outlined in 
the previous section, coupled with the fact that the absolute majority of NOCs are from 
developing home countries, these frameworks should be adapted. In this section we will start by 
discussing specific traits of emerging market (EM) MNCs internationalization and how they are 
related to those of SOE. Then, we will look at the recent empirical research in this field, as well 
as at the studies of NOC internationalization idiosyncrasies. In this way, we will identify specific 
area in NOC internalization process, that lacks sufficient attention of scholars. Further, on the 
basis of EM SOE internationalization literature we will develop a proposition in regard to this 
area and proceed with empirical analysis. 
Internationalization of MNCs from EM (EMNC) is one of the distinct and increasingly 
important stream if literature due to growing role of developing countries in their economy. So 
far, researchers have identified that EMNC internationalize in a different way from developed 
countries multinationals, in that the former have another set of ownership advantages, as well as 
other strategic intents. The reason for this is the home country embeddedness of EMNCs, which 
plays out in three areas (Meyer 2018). 
Firstly, institutional environment of home country influences the access to resources and 
shapes capabilities development, as well as the way EMNCs employ them when investing 
abroad (Hennart 2012). EMNCs often have to operate in a weak institutional environment, 
subject to market imperfections, government interventions and weak rule of law. Secondly, 
EMNCs rely on home country resources base, which can provide with FSA, unavailable in 
developed countries. It can be natural resources endowment, low cost labor, etc. On the other 
hand, EMNCs may lack traditional ownership advantages of multinationals from developed 
countries, such as technologies, brands, managerial skills. This leads to a specific strategic intent 
of emerging market multinationals – desire to overcome gaps by actively investing in emerging 
markets, which is called strategic assets seeking (Meyer 2018). In particular, EMNCs acquire 
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brands and technologically developed companies, which leads to ‘leapfrogging’ of less risky and 
expensive stages of internationalization. 
Finally, home country business ecosystem affect the opportunities for 
internationalization. The term refers to a network of formal links to business groups, as well as 
informal networks with supplies, government and peers. The role of ecosystem is especially 
important in EM due to weak institutional environment and bottlenecks in access to certain 
assets common in developed countries (Hobdari 2017). 
These three factors of home country embeddedness, as well as the lack of conditions for 
developing traditional ownership advantages in emerging markets means, that EMNCs possess a 
different set of FSAs. They arise from local conditions, and, as a result, better suited to 
developing country context (Li and Shapiro 2018). EMNCs ownership advantages can be 
grouped into six categories: resources, marketing, operational, institutional, political and 
innovative capabilities. 
The first type of emerging market FSAs is based on natural resources, such as oil&gas 
reserves. Companies can both extract and export them, and exploit them to build other 
advantages. For instance, Saudi Aramco internationalization builds on vast hydrocarbon reserves 
of its home country. The company both exports them, and create joint ventures abroad in 
downstream (refining) with a condition that host country will secure supply of Saudi oil to these 
refineries. 
Second type includes marketing and distribution capabilities. It means, that EMNCs often 
have large home country customer base, that allows them to understand the needs of consumers 
from other emerging markets. This allows the companies to develop products suitable to specific 
budgets and needs, although they do not possess extensive R&D capabilities (Ramamurti 2012).  
Next type comprises operational capabilities – ability to manage labor intensive 
production processes and low-cost supply chains. To some extent, these capabilities can be 
transferred to other emerging economies (Ramamurti 2012). The fourth type refers to 
institutional capabilities – operating in the environment of institutional voids, dealing with 
organized crime, understanding of privatization processes – knowing how to deals with these 
widespread in EM phenomena allows EMNCs effectively overcome obstacles across different 
developing countries (Meyer 2018). 
Political capabilities can also become a competitive advantage, because they allow to get 
preferential access to limited resources at home and compete with multinationals from developed 
nations at host countries with similar political and institutional setting. The last two sets of 
capabilities explain why EMNCs often prefer to invest in other developing countries  
(Meyer 2018). 
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The last type are innovation capabilities, also arising from local conditions. EMNCs 
initially performed adaptation of imported products to their markets. Some of them started to 
develop in this fields, such as ‘frugal innovation’ – creating very low cost versions of products 
for local markets. Such innovations can be transferred to other EMs and create an ownership 
advantages compared to developed counties MNCs (Meyer 2018). 
Thus, EMNCs differ in their FSAs and home country conditions, which make them to 
diverge from traditional patterns of FDI. Building on these traits, a special adaptation of 
internationalization theory for EMNCs was developed by researchers, which was summarized by 
Buckley et al. (2006). It is especially useful for this paper because it not only takes into account 
distinct traits of EMNCs, but also those of SOEs. In other words, his theory combines findings of 
two relevant streams of literature – internationalization of emerging market firms and state-
owned firms. We will first consider the theory itself and then move to recent empirical studies of 
EM state-owned firms FDI.  
According to the theory, the specific patterns of EM state-owned multinational 
companies (SOMNCs) foreign investment strategy result from three factors: capital market 
imperfections, special kind of ownership advantages, and distinct institutional factors of home 
countries. 
Capital market imperfections in emerging markets mean that companies may have an 
access to capital at below-market rates, which allows them to invest in projects with lower rates 
of return or overbid for them. In essence, cheap capital is used ownership advantage in 
internationalization strategies (Buckley 2004). Depending on country conditions, market 
imperfections can be caused by a combination of some of the following factors, common to 
emerging markets: 
1. Inefficient banking systems may allow cheap loans as a result of deliberate state 
policy, or as a result of a lack of information or experience. 
2. Conglomerates may have internal banks, which provide capital at a subsidies rates of 
return without additional supervision. 
3. Family finance is available to companies, owned by family members at below-market 
rates. 
4. State-owned firms are often less constrained by the risk of costs overrun because of 
the “soft budget” – state will bail-out SOEs in case of bankruptcy or provide 
additional financing if necessary. 
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These reasons are, in turn, caused by the lack of independent technical and financial 
evaluation of funding,  non-commercial goals of FDI decisions of SOE and limited perception of 
failure risks. Chinese investments are a typical example of capital market failures – over-bidding 
and acquisitions were for some time a ‘normal mode of entering of host economies’(Warner et 
al. 2004). 
Another distinctive feature of SOMNC internationalization strategy is that its ownership 
advantages are different from those predicated by general theory (discussed above). Apart from 
cheap capital, SOMNC may have an advantage of home country embeddedness or ability to 
engage in beneficial relations with local counterparts to get access to their resources – relational 
asset (Buckley et al. 2006). 
Embeddedness, in this case, means that SOMNCs are initially from emerging markets, 
which often have weak or moderate levels of institutional strength. Thus, companies have an 
inherent experience of operation is such environment, which gives them an advantage in 
acquiring “local knowledge” in similar contexts in other countries (Henderson and Ferguson 
2014; Buckley et al. 2007). Relational asset (Dunning 2002) means the ability to develop 
informal or unconventional networks to acquire information about investment opportunities, 
facilitate favorable decisions making and negotiation processes in a host country. 
The third feature of SOMNC foreign investment strategy is the influence of local 
institutions (‘rules of the game’, North 1990). Institutional environment has a strong influence on 
firm strategic decisions, both in formal an informal ways. SOMNCs are subject to institutional 
influence from government, such as preferential access to resources, political support and access 
to information, or vice versa – restrictions, numerous approvals of investment decisions, quotas. 
Thus, internationalization decisions are shaped and directed by official and informal institutions. 
This leads to the distortion of market-oriented incentives predicted by general theory. In 
particular, emerging market SOMNCs are often encouraged by home governments to invest in 
particular countries and projects not to realize its firm-specific advantages by combining them 
with country-specific advantages, but to develop those ownership advantages in the future. For 
instance, Chinese government supported asset-seeking acquisitions by its companies in 
developed countries to gain access to technologies, using vast amounts of cheap capital (Buckley 
et al. 2006). 
More fundamental interpretation of emerging markets SOE internationalization decision 
was undertaken by Wang et al. (2017). The authors contends, that state influences firm behavior 
through institutions – formal and informal in three different ways. One if the coercive 
isomorphism – political pressure and state regulations guide FDI decisions in a favorable for 
state way. The second type of influence is normative isomorphism – managers and executive 
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conform their decisions and behavior to established norms, which are significantly influenced by 
state authorities in emerging markets. Finally, mimetic isomorphism means, that firms imitate 
strategic behavior of successful firms. For instance, SOEs may internationalize to be perceived 
as “national champions” and get more state support. 
All three types of state institutional influence changes the access of a firm to resources 
and even the ability to use its own resources. This is the mechanism that changes FDI decisions, 
since the general theory predicts that foreign market entry is bundling of firm-specific assets and 
local assets. Thus, Wang et al. (2017) show, that state involvement influences firm-specific 
assets availability. Also, the authors distinguish between the effects of state equity ownership 
and government affiliation on either local or national level (connections of executives and state 
officials through participation or employment in the same entities, current or previous). 
In particular, their empirical research suggest that either type of state involvement 
facilitates internationalization thorough an increase in FDI. The authors interpret in the following 
way: politically connected firms have better access to resources, information and may even 
influence state regulations. Also, they identified, that state ownership facilitates resource-seeking 
FDI, that can be interpreted by the goal of central government to ensure natural resources supply 
(discussed in the previous section). 
Thus, these characteristics of SOMNCs internationalization process have a number of 
important implications to all three elements of the traditional paradigm – ownership and 
locations advantages, as well as internalization process. Some of them were already applied by 
scholars to NOCs in regard to ownership advantages and location choices. Recent empirical 
studies have also provided insights into how emerging markets SOMNCs execute FDI in practice 
in terms of internalization process. The summary of the most relevant empirical research is given 
in table 4. The table presents information about exact empirical setting and results, which is 
necessary to get an understanding of what has already been established, and what is left to be 
analyzed. 
The first important implication of home government political support, non-commercial 
goals of SOEs and imperfect capital markets is higher risk tolerance of state companies while 
investing in countries with weak institutional environment, which is often the case in the oil&gas 
industry given the pre-determined allocation of hydrocarbon resources. 
One of the reasons for higher risk acceptance is that SOMNCs are less exposed to 
expropriation risk of their foreign subsidiaries. It is a significant factor for any company in 
considering FDI. It exceeds many other concerns, such as macroeconomic uncertainty or labor 
market inefficiencies (World Bank 2009). Expropriation refers to the host-government 
intervention to property rights of an entrant, both as a one-time seize of assets and a series of 
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discriminatory moves (Kesternich and  Schnitzer 2010). An important consideration here is not 
only the sunk cost nature of lost assets but also the lack of any mechanism, which allows forcing 
host government to repay for the property. 
However, SOEs are less exposed to this kind of risk due to a number of reasons. 
According to empirical research results, the power of home state-owner of a company allows 
preventing SOEs’ assets from being expropriated. State enterprise can make use of a strong 
political influence of home government. This ‘gunboat diplomacy’ varies depending on the 
geopolitical power of the state. It can be reinforced, if host government has a strong bilateral 
trade relations with home government and depends on the latter in terms of economic help 
(Duanmu 2014). In this case, government would back its company to prevent expropriation and 
to demonstrate its retaliatory power to reduce the risk of such events in the future (Knutsen, 
Rygy and Hveem 2011). 
As a result, SOEs can invest in countries with weak institutional environment, because 
lack of property rights can be compensated by strong support of home government. An important 
implication of this study is that SOEs can be less constrained by expropriation risk in their 
decision on the level of ownership of foreign subsidiaries. Public companies often create EJV 
rather than WOS to prevent expropriation but for SOE it less relevant (Asiedu and Esfahani 
2001). Therefore, it potentially leads to a higher level of ownership by SOEs in overseas 
subsidiaries in risky environments. 
Empirical evidence of SOEs higher risk tolerance was found in a research conducted by 
Garcia-Canal and Guillen (2008). They analyzed foreign entries of Spanish firms into Latin 
American countries. The evidence from their research is highly relevant to this study in several 
prominent ways. 
First, they analyzed foreign investment decisions of companies from highly regulated 
industries – utilities, telecommunications, natural resources extraction. These industries have 
three important properties. One is that these industries are very concentrated and have features of 
natural monopolies – to be profitable they exploit economies of scale, but to achieve them it is 
necessary to secure large consumption amounts, that is market share.  
Table 4. Summary of the most relevant empirical studies of emerging markets SOEs internationalization 
Article Methodology4 Main findings Sample 
Wang, Hong, Kafouros, 
and Wright (2017). 
Exploring the role of 
government 
involvement in outward 
FDI from emerging 
economies. 
Predictors: marketing and technological 
resources (measured as expenditure per 
employee), firm capabilities (total  factor 
productivity), state ownership percentage, 
government affiliation level (local of the 
country) 
Outcome: the annual amount of FDI (in 
yuan) for each company 
1. Increase in government involvement (state 
ownership or affiliation) level leads to an increase 
in firm FDI. 
2. Affiliation to a high government level increases 
investments in developed markets. 
3. State ownership increases resource-seeking FDI, 
while government affiliation increases market-
seeking FDI. 
626 Chinese companies 
(SOEs and POEs5) 
during 2006-2007, no 
industry specification 
Pinto, Ferreira, Falaster, 
M.Fleury, and A.Fleury 
(2017). Ownership in 
cross-border 
acquisitions and the 
role of government 
support. 
Predictors: institutional distance (calculated 
through 9 factors) between home and host 
countries, country knowledge (Berry et al. 
2010), business knowledge, government 
stake, financing and political ties as 
separate variables.  
Outcome: ownership in an acquired firm 
– either full (100%), or partial (less than 
100%). 
1. Emerging market MNCs tend to make a full 
acquisition to access knowledge. 
2. Government stake and political ties both 
increase the chance for a company to have a full 
cross-border acquisition rather than partial. 
3. Firms with government participation or political 
ties prefer full acquisition to partial when 
accessing business knowledge. 
262 cross-border 
acquisitions by 134 
Brazilian firms (POEs 
and partially state-
owned) during 2006-
2012, no industry 
specification 
Duanmu (2014). 
State-owned MNCs and 
host country 
expropriation risk: the 
role of home state 
power and economic 
gunboat diplomacy. 
Predictors: property right protection index 
(Heritage Foundation), state ownership, 
UNO GA voting index, % of country export 
to China. 
Outcome: the scale of FDI  (log-
transformed USD value) in a company-
year-country combination (scale of FDI in 
a given location). 
1. High expropriation risk reduces FDI to a host 
country. 
2. Positive political relations mitigate 
expropriation risk, especially for SOEs. 
3. The economic power of home government 
(measured as host country export dependence on 
Chinese market) mitigates expropriation risk for 
SOEs. 
894 FDI by Chinese 
companies during 2003-
2010 (SOEs and POEs, 
defined as zero state 
ownership), no industry 
specification 
                                                          
4 In this table each paper includes several types of regression models. 
5 POE stands for privately-owned enterprise – the one with majority stake held by non-state investors. Otherwise (for some examined papers), the meaning is specified. 
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Pan, Teng, Supapol, Lu, 
Huang, and Wang 
(2014). Firm’s FDI 
ownership: the 
influence of 
government ownership 
and legislative 
connections. 
Predictors: foreign institutional environment 
(Economic Freedom Index), % state 
ownership, legislative connection (1 if 
present – one of the executives is a member 
of the legislature). 
Outcome: percentage ownership in a 
foreign subsidiary 
1. Positive institutional environment increases 
ownership in foreign subsidiaries, vice versa is 
also true. 
2. The influence of institutional environment on a 
foreign subsidiary ownership is negatively 
moderated by state ownership and legislative 
connections – firms with either factor have higher 
subsidiary ownership in unfavorable environments 
and lower in favorable ones. 
1617 foreign subsidiaries 
of 594 listed Chinese 
companies (both SOEs 
and POEs), studied as of 
2010, no industry 
specification 
Lin and Jiang (2012). 
State ownership effect 
on firms’ FDI 
ownership decisions 
under institutional 
pressure: a study of 
Chinese outward-
investing firms  
Predictors: survey results of Chinese 
executives (Likert scale) as proxies for 
home and host country regulatory 
restrictions, host normative pressure; state 
ownership. 
Outcome: a choice between EJV and 
WOS 
1. SOEs are more sensitive to home and host 
country regulatory restrictions, as well as host 
country normative pressure (negative image): the 
more severe any of these conditions, the more 
likely is that SOEs will opt for an EJV (defined as 
entrant stake less than 95%) rather than WOS. 
132 FDI entries of 
Chinese companies 
(SOEs and POEs) during 
2000-2006, no industry 
specification 
Buckley, Clegg, Cross, 
Liu, Voss, and Zheng 
(2007). The 
determinants of Chinese 
outward foreign direct 
investment. 
Predictors: 12 factors and their interaction 
effects. 
Outcome: distribution of outward FDI in 
dollar value (location choice) 
1. Investments are positively associated (increase) 
with an increase in political risk, cultural 
proximity, host country inflation, Chinese FDI 
policy liberalization, host country market size. 
2. Market openness, exchange rate, geographic 
distance, resource endowment and market size are 
insignificant predictors of OFDI distribution. 
Outward direct 
investments in USD from 
China (only SOEs) 
across 49 host countries 
during 1984-2001, no 
industry specification 
Ramaswamy, Yeung, 
Laforet (2010). China’s 
outward foreign direct 
investment: location 
choice and firm 
ownership. 
Predictors: interaction between ownership 
and host country political risk, resource 
endowment, number of patents, geographic 
distance as predictors in a regression.  
Outcome: number of entries (location 
choice). 
1. SOEs have a higher tendency to invest in 
countries with high political risk and in locations 
with larger geographic distance from the home 
country.  
2. Both SOEs and POEs invest in resource-rich 
countries, as well as large developing markets. 
1350 Chinese FDI (SOEs 
and POCs according to 
dominant stakeholder) 
projects during 2006-
2008 across 59 countries, 
no industry specification 
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Garcia-Canal and 
Guillen (2008). Risk 
and the strategy of 
foreign location choice 
in regulated industries. 
Predictors: macroeconomic uncertainty 
(authors calculation), political instability 
(POLCON V), number of previous entries 
and ownership type. 
Outcome: number of entries in each 
country-year-company combination. 
Influence of firm ownership and 
experience on attitude towards FDI in 
risky locations.  
1. Firms in regulated industries are averse to 
macroeconomic risk but eager to invest in 
countries with discretionary policy decisions.  
2. Partially state-owned firms are less risk averse 
accordingly to these 2 factors. 
3. As companies accumulate experience (number 
of entries), they develop an aversion towards 
entering risky locations. 
247 FDI entries of 
Spanish companies 
(banking, oil&gas, 
telecommunications, 
utilities sector) in Latin 
American countries 
during 1987-2000 
(Partially state-owned 
and POEs defined as zero 
state stake) 
This leads to an oligopolistic nature of regulates industries. Second, entering a foreign 
market often require a permit or a license from host government. Third, government tends to 
keep a significant share of the industry market in its ownership. Due to these reasons, strong 
first-movers advantages exist in these sectors of the economy. Foreign entries of companies in 
regulated industries require large upfront investments, frequently in a form of greenfields or 
acquisitions. As a result, companies are less risk tolerant and more averse to investments in 
countries with poor quality of institutions.  
Second, Garcia-Canal and Guillen found that state ownership acts as a moderating factor 
in investment decisions regarding entrance to risky locations. They proved, that partially 
privatized SOEs prefer higher ownership of subsidiaries abroad. Researchers suggest a 
theoretical explanation to this result: managers of partially privatized firms are at risk of losing 
their jobs because of the change in ownership structure, which they try to confront by bold 
moves. In comparison, fully state-owned companies have no incentive to invest abroad because 
their position at home market is strong and they do not have much to gain from 
internationalization. Managers of fully private companies demonstrate average market sentiment 
to risk (Garcia-Canal and Guillen 2008).  
Although this theoretical explanation is questionable and requires further empirical 
evidence, their particular research contributes to this paper by directly considering the influence 
of state ownership on the level of participation in foreign subsidiaries: with an increase in state 
stake in a company, it increasingly prefers higher ownership in foreign projects. The authors 
considered companies from all sectors, only three of which were from oil&gas and of a relatively 
small size (which is not representative enough for the industry). However, all companies were 
from regulated industries, which share common features with oil&gas industry. Hence, there is 
an opportunity to extrapolate results of their research to global oil&gas industry. 
Another relevant research was done by Pan et al. (2014) on a sample of Chinese 
companies. The researchers argued, that two political factors – state ownership and legislative 
connection – influence transaction costs associated with foreign market entry, thus changing the 
ownership level in overseas subsidiaries.  
In particular, state as an owner affects transaction costs in two ways. On the one hand, 
state ownership makes companies pursue non-commercial goals, as was already discussed. It 
decreases the relative importance of commercial goals, which means that transaction costs are 
perceived as less in amount or less important. On the other hand, state provides its companies 
with additional resources (soft budget constraint, etc.), which allows covering additional 
transaction costs, associated with uncertain environment (i.e. weak institutions). 
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The second factor – legislative connections – means, that if some of the top executives, 
members of the board of directors, or a shareholder with more than 10% equity is a member of 
home country’s legislative body, than this company has additional political embeddedness in the 
country. Legislative connections decrease transaction costs for company in three ways. First, 
politically connected firm enjoys the flow of information regarding relevant legislation ahead of 
time and of better quality, which allows correcting its FDI decisions beforehand. Second, such 
company can influence change in regulations of home country regarding FDI, bargaining better 
conditions or additional resources. Finally, legislative connections also provide social ties, which 
is an important way to access information and promote favorable decisions in emerging 
countries. 
Empirical results of the study provide evidence, that state ownership serves as a negative 
moderator to the level of participation in foreign subsidiaries in uncertain environments. It 
means, that the higher the state ownership, the large stake a company will pursue while entering 
a foreign market. The significance of this research is that the authors accomplished important 
goals – they connected political factors to transaction costs theory so that they can complement 
theories of FDI, based on frameworks of Coase and Williamson. 
So far, empirical evidence was presented to the fact that state ownership makes 
companies have a larger stake in their foreign subsidiaries. However, there is also some evidence 
of the opposite. The most relevant paper in this regards was written by Cui and Jiang (2012).  
Taking an institutional perspective on FDI decisions, the authors examined how home and host 
countries regulatory restrictions and normative pressure affects ownership level in foreign 
subsidiaries of Chinese companies. 
The first argument of researches states, that companies with majority state ownership are 
influenced not only by outward investments regulations, as any other firm. SOEs are also 
dependent on government in terms of resources and valuable inputs in home markets and their 
major investment decisions should be approved by several state entities. Also, Chinese 
government preferred joint ventures some time ago because of their positive effect on the 
country economic development. As a result, SOEs strongly aligned its FDI decisions with 
government preferences and choose JVs instead of WOS. 
According to the second argument, SOEs are subject to intense scrutiny of host 
governments because of their strong affiliation with home country government. The pursuit of 
non-commercial goals and backing by powerful government make other countries impose 
additional restrictions on the investments of such SOEs to make sure that their FDI do not harm 
their economies for the good of Chinese economy. At the same time, JVs with local companies 
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provided opportunities to reduce this skepticism. For this reason, Chinese SOEs again preferred 
shared ownership of foreign subsidiaries to WOS. 
Finally, any investor is subject to the “liability of foreignness” – the necessity to obtain 
local legitimacy because of the different normative framework, in which an entrant has to 
operate in comparison with home market. In case of SOEs, this liability is magnified, for the 
same reasons – public skepticism towards their goals. Formation of JV with a local company 
helps to overcome this issue by ensuring the public that FDI will support their economy, and by 
providing an entrant with information regarding local norms from a partner.  
These arguments were tested on a sample of Chinese companies and a negative 
moderating effect of state ownership on the level of participation in foreign subsidiaries was 
confirmed. That is, the higher the former factor, the lower the latter. The results of this research 
contradict previously cited studies. However, the extent to which these findings can be 
generalized is questionable. First, the fact that SOE aligns its strategic decisions with 
government policies is more than reasonable (unless SOE is a more powerful actor in this 
relationship). At the same time, the study was concerned a specific period in Chinese outward 
direct investment policy. Another paper examined this policy through multiple periods and 
confirmed, that government preference for JVs changes to WOS (Buckley et al. 2007). 
Government policies differ among countries and are subject to change in time. Therefore, this 
argument cannot be generalized to all SOEs.  
Second, it is also hard to question the existence of restrictions and liability of foreignness 
towards FDI in the oil&gas sector. However, multiples examples (see section 2) demonstrate, 
that government can by-pass restrictions to its SOEs by negotiating directly with host 
government. Also, public image of Chinese companies cannot be generalized to all SOEs 
because the perception of different governments intents (and their SOEs in turn) varies across 
countries. Therefore, empirical findings regarding the positive moderating effect of government 
ownership on a higher level of participation in foreign subsidiaries capital were not significantly 
challenged yet. 
In contrast to majority state ownership, the influence of minority stakes held by 
government on strategic choice of firms is much less explored. A number of studies found out 
that in weak institutional environments minority government stakes may have a positive 
influence on company performance. The main reason is that in a form of equity purchases state 
can provide financing, which is often hard to obtain due to underdeveloped capital markets (Wu 
2011). However, this effect only occurs when state do not have some other residual way on 
influencing firm decisions (Inoue, Lazzarini, and Musacchio 2013). The main question for this 
paper is whether the effects of majority state ownership in terms of FDI decisions also apply to 
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companies with minority state ownership, possibly to a lower extent. Unfortunately, there even 
to theoretical findings, which would support some propositions in this regards. Due to this 
reason, the main focus of this study is to investigate the difference between two broad categories: 
majority and minority state ownership on internationalization decisions. 
To sum up, emerging market SOMNCs internationalization differs from that of a private 
multinational company. It is a result of three factors: capital market imperfections, strong 
influence of emerging market institutions and distinct ownership advantages, such as relational 
asset and home country embeddedness. A different strategy of SOMNCs leads to another 
parameter of decision-making in deciding on the level of participation in foreign subsidiaries – 
state companies prefer a higher degree of control, even if it means overinvesting and dealing 
with significant risks. 
Scholars have also applied findings of EMNCs and SOMNCs literature to understand the 
behavior of NOC internationalization (recent studies are summarized in table 5).  In particular, 
recent studies concentrated on applying case study method to exploring strategic intent of NOC 
internationalization, their ownership advantages, and the influence of government ownership and 
intervention on both. 
The comparative study of Chinese and Indian NOCs conducted by Meckling et al. (2015) 
demonstrated, that strategic intent is often a product of company and government cooperation 
and competition – coopetition, rather than a set of solely commercial or non-commercial goals. 
NOC depend on their home government for access to resources, maintenance of favorable 
regulations and political support abroad. At the same time, the government needs NOC to ensure 
supply of oil, or promote political or trade goals. Thus, NOCs is neither foreign policy arms of 
government nor independent powerful actors.  
The combination of commercial and non-commercial goals of NOC is determined by two 
processes – marketization and governance reforms. Marketization refers to the process of re-
orienting on marketing goals, commercialization of activities. Governance structure means a 
system of regulations and state entities that control oil&gas industry development in home 
country. The more marketized NOC is and the looser is industry regulations, the more a 
company will pursue commercial goals. Therefore, state influence on strategic intents of NOC is 
somewhat heterogeneous across countries. 
 Table 5. Summary of the most relevant studies of NOCs internationalization 
Article Methodology Main findings Sample 
Lopez-Morales et al. 
(2017). Internationalization 
of state multilatinas: the 
multi-case study in the oil 
sector. 
A case study of three largest South 
American oil companies 
internationalization with an emphasis 
of the relationship between resource 
endowment, company origin, state 
ownership and location of FDI. 
1. Resource endowment significantly influenced location 
choice: Petrobras with resource scarce home country 
invested in developing countries with vast reserves, 
while the other two invested in developed countries.  
PDVSA, 
Petrobras, Pemex 
internationalization 
modes from the 
first foreign entry 
for each company 
(apart from 
exporting). 
Panibratov A. (2017). 
Russian oil and gas MNEs 
investing in China: the role 
of government in value 
creation.  
A case study of two largest Russian 
NOCs internationalization to China 
with an emphasis on Russian 
government role in the process. 
1. Russian NOCs country embeddedness facilitated entry 
to China – another country with the high role of informal 
institutions. 
2. Russian government significantly helped its NOCs to 
internationalize through financing, intergovernmental 
agreements, and aid in transportation system creation. 
3. Government involvement shaped the entry modes 
through intergovernmental agreements – primarily 
exporting through pipelines, but also JVs in the 
downstream. 
Gazprom and 
Rosneft FDI to 
China (2002-2015) 
Lai, Hara, and 
Wysoczanska (2015). 
Rationale of 
internationalization of 
China’s national oil 
companies: seeking natural 
resources, strategic assets 
or sectoral specialization? 
Case study of two largest Chinese 
NOCs outward FDI to identify intent 
for internationalization: seeking natural 
resources, strategic assets or sectoral 
specialization (upstream companies 
invest in natural resources, while 
downstream - in strategic assets). 
1. Sectoral specialization best explains the primary goal 
of investing abroad: upstream-oriented CNPC 
concentrated on exploration and production projects, 
while downstream oriented Sinopec heavily 
concentrated on acquiring technological expertise, 
managerial skills, distribution networks.  
2. Strategic assets seeking is the second most important 
intent for EMNCs FDI. 
CNPC and 
Sinopec FDI deals 
during 2002-2010. 
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Meckling, Kong, and 
Madan (2015). Oil and state 
capitalism: government-
firm coopetition in India 
and China. 
A comparative case study of Chinese 
and Indian NOCs internationalization 
and state regulation of the industry in 
two countries. 
1. NOCs internationalization is influenced by a hybrid of 
state non-commercial goals and market-oriented goals.  
2. The state acts both as a supporting and competing for 
entity, that results in coopetition of NOCs and 
government interests. 
3. The exact combination of intents in such a hybrid is a 
result of industry governance reforms and marketization 
processes. 
CNPC, Sinopec, 
CNOOC, GAIL, 
OIL, ONGC, 
IOCL, HPCL 
during  
1990-2013. 
Bass and Chakrabarty 
(2014). Resource security: 
competition for global 
resources, strategic intent, 
and governments as 
owners. 
OLS and binary logistic regression. 
Predictors: state ownership percentage, 
target country resource richness, firm’s 
experience working in a target country. 
Outcome: number and price of 
acquisitions of exploration and 
production assets. 
1. Firms with higher state ownership tend to prefer 
investing in exploration rather than production assets 
and pay more for the former.  
2. Firms with higher state ownership prefer to acquire 
exploration assets and pay more for them in resource-
rich countries, in which they have prior experience of 
FDI. 
Thus, SOE is more concerned with future supplies. 
404 upstream 
transactions (and 
the price paid for 
each) during 2005-
2012 of NOCs and 
privately-owned 
oil companies 
Carvalho and Goldstein 
(2009). The ‘making of’ 
national giants: technology 
and governments shaping 
the international expansion 
of oil companies from 
Brazil and China. 
Case study of the largest oil companies 
in China and Brazil with an aim to 
identify what role firm level of 
technological expertise and 
government involvement played in the 
strategic intent and ownership 
advantages during internationalization. 
1. The way government involvement is conducted 
influences the strategic intent of emerging markets oil 
companies.  
2. Brazilian government fostered specific (deepwater) 
capabilities development by the company, which gave it 
an advantage. As a result, Petrobras was relatively 
independent in its internationalization, primarily 
investing in downstream (strategic asset seeking).  
3. Chinese government encouraged large-scale 
investments both to secure natural resources supply and 
to gain technological capabilities (strategic asset 
seeking). The main advantage of firms in this case was 
political support and access to capital. 
Petrobras (study 
period: 1972-
2008), CNPC, 
Sinopec, CNOOC 
(1990-s – 2008) 
Moreover, the way government interfered in the process of development of an oil 
company during a pre-internationalization stage influences its ownership advantages. Carvalho 
and Goldstein (2009) found, that if government emphasized strategic capabilities development 
in-house, then NOC might have a more traditional FSA, similar to that of IOCs. In turn, it would 
give an oil company more freedom in strategic decisions due to less resource dependence on 
government. However, such a situation requires a presence of local conditions, that would allow 
or require development of such conditions. More often than not, governments encourage NOCs 
to invest abroad to acquire lacking FSAs, such as technologies, rather than apply them for 
commercial benefit. 
Government involvement was also found to interact with other determinants of strategic 
intents, namely resource endowment. If a home country have ample hydrocarbon reserves, than 
government would encourage companies to invest in downstream assets in developed countries, 
acquire technological capabilities in refining and exploit resource richness. In contrast, the lack 
of oil&gas would mean that NOCs concentrate on ensuring stable supply of the resource to the 
home country and invest in upstream assets abroad (Lopez-Morales et al. 2017).  
The last factor is powerful enough to overrule government regulations heterogeneity. 
Bass and Chakrabarty (2014) provided empirical evidence of NOC preference to invest in 
upstream exploration rather than exploitation assets. That is, relative to IOCs, national oil 
companies invest more in explored, but untapped oilfields. NOCs are also ready to pay more for 
this kind of reserves. Bass and Chakrabarty interpret this fact from a resource security 
perspective – governments want to ensure stable oil&gas supply in the future and makes their oil 
companies to buy reserves that can be exploited later.  
Another explanation of NOC strategic intent was outlined by Lai et al. (2014). The 
authors claim, that NOC invest according to their sectoral specialization: predominantly 
downstream companies invest in refining and distribution of oil, while upstream companies 
invest in exploration and production project abroad. While there is rationale in this statement, at 
this point it was only confirmed by a case study of two Chinese NOCs, which does not seem 
enough to be generalizable for all NOCs.  
Finally, as with other SOMNCs, government was confirmed to be an important 
supporting but also directing partner in NOC internationalization. Case study by Panibratov 
(2017) identified a crucial role of government in the internationalization of two Russian NOCs to 
China. On the one hand, state political efforts and financial support allowed to create large-scale 
pipeline infrastructure and decrease risks through high level intergovernmental negotiations. On 
the other hand, Russian NOCs did not have much choice but to agree to proposed projects. 
Although the commercial viability of the projects may not be questionable, that degree of 
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managerial autonomy in decision making, i.e. in location and internalization choices, was 
significantly affected by strong government involvement. 
 
1.5 Proposition statement 
In the previous sections, it was established that firms decide to internationalize when 
there is an opportunity to combine their firm-specific advantages with local complementary 
advantages and do so by internalizing the operations abroad. The mode of market entry is a result 
of two factors. One is a desire for control of an entrant, which is determined by a tradeoff 
between risk and return. Another factor is the characteristics of assets of an entrant and of local 
companies. If there are high costs to trade these assets in the market, that is, to sell or obtain 
them on a contractual basis, then loose forms of control for market entrance cannot be used 
(licensing). Further, the choice of the level of participation is a result of local market efficiencies 
– the same complementary assets can be obtained at assets, asset services, or firms markets.  
Upstream oil&gas segment has a number of specific traits, which differentiate it from 
other industries and influence the general model of firms internationalization. One important 
characteristic is immutability of geographical resources – hydrocarbon reserves are 
asymmetrically distributed. Therefore, companies have to invest in locations, where these 
reserves are present. They have to do so despite the fact that the majority of these countries have 
a poor quality of institutions, which increases transaction costs. The result is that host countries 
governments have strong location advantages. The last two facts often lead to inefficient asset 
and asset service local markets because of the restrictive regulations of the host government. 
At the same time, oil companies use their ownership advantages to exchange for 
locational advantages of host countries. However, ownership advantages have high transaction 
costs to transfer. Coupled with the need to recover depleted resources, it means that oil&gas 
companies need to internalize operations, which effectively reduces their choice to either WOS 
or EJV. 
Apart from the specifics of the oil&gas industry, the general model of internationalization 
is influenced by state-ownership of the majority of oil companies. National oil companies as a 
phenomenon in international oil&gas economics were thoroughly studied in terms of their 
efficiency and strategic goals. Recent studies have also highlighted idiosyncrasies of NOC 
internationalization in regard to strategic intent and ownership advantages.  
Meckling et al (2015) identified that the process of determining strategic goals is a result 
of cooperation and competition of home government and oil company management. It means, 
that the combination of commercial and non-commercial goals can differ based on the country 
context. However, Bass and Chakrabarty (2014) have found, that resource endowment of a 
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country is a factor more powerful than domestic political heterogeneity. In particular, 
governments are often concerned with long-term energy security, which makes them encourage 
their NOCs to invest relatively more in untapped oilfields to ensure future supplies. Another 
study found, that strategic intents of foreign expansion may be shaped by sectoral specialization 
– downstream companies invest relatively more in refining and distribution, while upstream – in 
exploration and production (Lai et al. 2014). Also, drawing on EMNC literature, scholars have 
pointed at the role of home country government in promoting FDI in NOCs in other countries, 
including those with the high importance of informal context (Panibratov 2017).  
Thus, the research has recently focused on studying strategic goals and FSAs of 
internationalizing NOCs using case study method. Another area – internalization process, and, in 
particular, the influence of government ownership on the level of participation in foreign 
subsidiaries, have received less attention. At the same time, scholars of EMNCs and SOMNCs 
have developed and tested a number of propositions, that can be applied to NOCs to analyze the 
level of participation in foreign subsidiaries. These findings can be applied to national oil 
companies for three reasons: NOCs are state-owned companies (1), the absolute majority of 
largest NOCs (with only one exception) are from emerging markets (2), oil companies have to 
invest in risky locations (3). 
In a recent study, Pinto et al. (2017) found that affiliation to a high government level or 
government stake in a company increases the chance for EMNC to make a full acquisition 
abroad, rather than partial. Also, state ownership increases the chances that a company will make 
a full acquisition if the intent of FDI is accessing business knowledge. It can be interpreted by 
the fact that EMNCs often try to build lacking ownership advantages abroad. Duanmu (2014) 
found support for the proposition that SOEs invest more in locations with weak institutional 
environments if their home country governments have high economic power or are in good 
political relations with host country governments. Pan et al. (2014) confirmed that economic 
uncertainty and political riskiness of host country reduces the level of ownership in foreign 
subsidiaries. However, this effect is moderated by state-ownership of legislative connections (in 
home country) of an entrant – either factor increases ownership level relative to POEs without 
legislative connections. 
Earlier studies have also confirmed that companies with state ownership have a relatively 
higher level of participation in foreign subsidiaries in risky locations, which is highly relevant to 
the upstream oil&gas industry. Garcia-Canal and Guillen (2008) suggested, on the basis of 
empirical evidence, that partially state-owned firms are less risk-averse in an uncertain 
environment. Buckley et al. (2007) also found that SOMNCs relatively more invest in countries 
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with high political risk and larger distances from a home country. These propositions were 
further confirmed by Ramaswamy et al. (2010). 
To conclude, scholars have found enough evidence that emerging market SOMNCs can 
deal with higher transaction costs, accept lower returns, and negotiate desirable conditions in 
uncertain environments. Reasons for that include non-commercial goals and political support of 
home government, availability of cheap capital, expertise in operations in weak institutional 
environments. As a result, state companies, in general, prefer and are able to obtain a higher 
equity stake in foreign projects in risky countries. These findings can be applied to NOCs to 
understand the influence of government ownership on the participation level in foreign 
subsidiaries, which leads to the following proposition. 
Proposition: Majority state-owned oil&gas companies have a higher equity share in their 
foreign upstream subsidiaries relative to companies with no government stake. 
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2. Empirical research design 
2.1 Empirical setting  
To estimate the influence of state ownership on the level of participation in overseas 
subsidiaries a sample of 441 subsidiaries of 25 oil companies was analyzed. These oil and gas 
subsidiaries are upstream projects, located outside of the home country of a respective oil 
company. It is worth noting, that only those exploration projects were considered, that have 
already produced some positive results (in terms of commercial hydrocarbon reserves) because 
ownership stakes are often subject to change after initial exploration was finished. Thus, permits 
and licenses without any research made were not considered  
Table 4. List of oil companies in the research sample. 
Company (home country) State ownership share (%) Revenue (bln USD) 
BP (the UK) 0 240 
Shell (the UK, the 
Netherlands) 0 305 
Exxon Mobil (USA) 0 237 
Chevron (USA) 0 135 
Total (France) 0 172 
MOL Group (Hungary) 25 15 
Petrobras (Brazil) 29 89 
Eni (Italy) 30 63 
OMV (Austria) 32 23 
Gazprom (Russia) 50 105 
PTT (Thailand) 51 63 
Statoil (Norway) 67 61 
ONGC (India) 69 22 
Rosneft (Russia) 70 103 
Sinopec (China) 71 363 
PetroChina (China) 87 310 
Saudi Aramco (Saudi Arabia) 100 363 
PDVSA (Venezuela) 100 48 
Sonatrach (Algeria) 100 31 
KPC (Kuwait) 100 252 
QP (Qatar) 100 50 
Pemex (Mexico) 100 58 
Petronas (Malasia) 100 46 
Sonatrach (Algeria 100 31 
KNOC (South Korea) 100 20 
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Another constraint was the availability of data for non-public NOCs, and, on the opposite – 
the number of projects of IOCs. As a result, the most significant foreign upstream projects were 
considered, as defined by each company in terms of hydrocarbons output (amount extracted).  
The companies for this sample were drawn from a widely accepted ranking of the leaders 
of global oil&gas industry -  S&P Global Platts. The list includes global oil&gas companies 
based on a proprietary formula, which includes asset worth, revenues, profit, ROIC and other 
parameters. Those companies are top 25 in the Platts list, with a few exceptions – some 
companies were substituted with those with lower ranks because of the availability of data issue 
(in particular, Iranian and Nigerian NOCs). There are 16 companies with majority state 
ownership, 4 companies with minority state ownership and 5 companies with no government 
stake in the sample.  
The unit of analysis is an observation – foreign subsidiary (upstream project), which 
consists of a company’s stake in a separate foreign project, the share of home country 
government in that company equity ownership and economic freedom index value of a host 
country. 
 
2.2 Method and variables 
Simple linear regression model was used as follows:  
Company stake in a foreign project = b0 + b1*government ownership in a company  
+ b2*economic freedom index 
Thus, company stake is a dependent variable, measured as: 
Percent ownership in a project*100 
The independent variable is state ownership in a company. For this variable, dummy 
variables were constructed to form 3 categories:  
No state ownership (baseline category) 
Minority state ownership (less than 50%) 
Majority state ownership (more than 50%) 
Consistent with the literature (Garcia-Canal and Guillen 2008) a control variable was 
added – economic freedom index – as a measure of institutional environment development. This 
will allow fixing probable negative correlation between weak institutions and level of ownership 
in a subsidiary, observed by general research on FDI modes (discussed in the first chapter). 
However, after simple regression, this variable proved to produce negligible results (discussion 
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below). For this reason, it was not included in the binary regression. In a simple regression 
control variable was added at the first stage (model 1), and independent variables at the second 
stage (model 2), which is the main focus of the study. 
 
Binary logistic regression was applied as follows:  
Company stake in a foreign project = b0 + b1*government ownership in a company 
Company stake was a dependent variable, measured as a categorical variable with two 
types: minority company stake and majority company stake.  
Independent variable was state ownership level in a company, measured as a categorical 
variable with three types: no state ownership (baseline category), minority state ownership, 
majority state ownership. In case of an equal stake in a project, the company-operator of the 
subsidiary was treated as a majority holder, because it controls an entity. No oil&gas companies 
with equal state and private ownership were observed in the sample. 
The data on state ownership and foreign upstream projects of chosen companies was 
collected from their most recent annual reports and official websites. Economic Freedom Index 
values were taken from the website of Heritage Foundation – non-profit think tank, which 
estimates those values on an annual basis. 
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3. Empirical research results 
3.1 Linear regression 
The results of linear regression analysis are presented below. Model 1 shows the results 
when only the control variable was included. In model 2 independent variables were included. It 
can be seen, that control variable has virtually no effect on the outcome as measured by 
determination coefficient – 2,7%, while independent variables have a moderate size of an effect 
– 17,5%. The Durbin-Watson test indicates, that autocorrelation is not a concern for the model 
(statistic is less than 2). 
 
Table 5. Linear regression model summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,166a ,027 ,025 22,021  
2 ,418b ,175 ,169 20,329 1,595 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Economic Freedom Index 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Economic Freedom Index, Minority state ownership, 
Majority state ownership 
c. Dependent Variable: Company stake in a project 
First model is significant at p<0.001. The main model is also significant at p<0.001 (table 6). 
Table 6. Linear regression significance test (ANOVAa) 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 6010,646 1 6010,646 12,394 ,000b 
Residual 212890,783 439 484,945   
Total 218901,429 440    
2 Regression 38306,991 3 12768,997 30,898 ,000c 
Residual 180594,438 437 413,260   
Total 218901,429 440    
a. Dependent Variable: Company stake in a project 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Economic Freedom Index 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Economic Freedom Index, Minority state ownership, 
Majority state ownership 
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A t-test of the control variable in both models is significant at p<0.001, but indicates only 
a marginal change. 
T-tests of other parameters indicate, that an increase in state ownership from 0 to a 
minority stake does not affect the company ownership of overseas oil&gas subsidiaries - 
coefficient is not significant at p>0,5. At the same time, majority state ownership is a significant 
predictor with unstandardized beta of 19%, at p<0,01 (table 7 below). 
While the determination coefficient shows moderate size of an effect, the unstandardized 
coefficient (B) demonstrates, that the change in category of state ownership from 0 government 
stake to a majority stake leads to an increase of about 19% of a company share in its foreign 
project. 
 
Table 7. Linear regression coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 53,723 4,178  12,858 ,000   
Economic Freedom Index -,231 ,066 -,166 -3,521 ,000 1,000 1,000 
2 (Constant) 38,921 4,311  9,028 ,000   
Economic Freedom Index -,128 ,062 -,092 -2,070 ,039 ,962 1,040 
Minority state ownership 4,396 2,621 ,080 1,677 ,094 ,820 1,220 
Majority state ownership 19,048 2,222 ,418 8,571 ,000 ,794 1,259 
a. Dependent Variable: Company stake in a project 
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Finally, matrix below shows that there is no significant correlation between independent 
variables in the model (less than 0,8). 
Table 8. Correlations 
 
Company 
stake in a 
project 
Economic 
Freedom 
Index 
Minority state 
ownership 
Majority 
state owned 
Pearson 
Correlation 
Company stake in a project 1,000 -,166 -,094 ,400 
Economic Freedom Index -,166 1,000 -,003 -,177 
Minority state ownership -,094 -,003 1,000 -,417 
Majority state owned ,400 -,177 -,417 1,000 
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
Company stake in a project . ,000 ,025 ,000 
Economic Freedom Index ,000 . ,476 ,000 
Minority state ownership ,025 ,476 . ,000 
Majority state owned ,000 ,000 ,000 . 
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3.2 Binary logistic regression 
Binary logistics regression estimates the likelihood of a certain outcome based on the 
predictors, unlike the linear regression, which measures the direct casual relationship between 
independent and dependent varibles. In this paper, binary regression estimates the odds of having 
a majority in overseas projects using state ownership in a company as predictors. 
The results of chi-square statistic shows that the model is a highly significant fit for the 
data at p<0,01. Results for the three rows are the same because one step model was used. 
Table 9. Binary regression significance test 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 43,029 2 ,000 
Block 43,029 2 ,000 
Model 43,029 2 ,000 
Results of Nagelkerke pseudo R square shows that the model predicts a moderate size of 
an effect of 14,1% (table 9). There is also an alternative measure produced – Cox & Snell R 
square. Both measures are computed to approximate determination coefficient for binary 
regression, in which this measure cannot be tracked directly. 
Table 10. Model Summary 
Step 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell 
R Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 433,987a ,093 ,141 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 
because parameter estimates changed by less than 
,001. 
Next page provides the table with parameter estimates and interpretation. 
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Results of the Wald test statistics indicate that minority state ownership does not make a 
significant contribution towards assessing whether a company will have a majority stake in a 
foreign subsidiary at p>0,05. However, majority ownership is a significant predictor at p<0,01. 
Change in the odds (Exp(B)) of having a majority stake relative to a minority stake in a 
foreign subsidiary when moving from no state ownership to a majority stake in a company is 
5,56, which means, that companies with majority government ownership are more likely to have 
a majority in overseas project. 
Table 11. Parameter Estimates 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Minority state 
ownership 
,588 ,371 2,518 1 ,113 1,801 
Majority state owned 1,716 ,293 34,180 1 ,000 5,560 
Constant -2,159 ,249 75,257 1 ,000 ,115 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Minority state ownership, Majority state owned. 
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3.3 Results discussion and research limitations 
In this section we will outline empirical research results, for which the possible theoretical 
interpretation will be provided in the next chapter. The second part of the section is devoted to 
discussion of limitations of this research, as well as suggestions of how future research can build 
on these results. 
The linear regression analysis showed that SOEs tend to have a 19% higher share in 
foreign subsidiaries, compared to companies with no government stakes (table 12, illustrative). 
Binary logistic regression also confirmed that likelihood of having a majority stake in a foreign 
subsidiary is higher for SOEs, compared to fully private companies. This could mean a 
significant difference in terms of control over the project, as well as the amount of investments 
and risks undertaken.  
 
However, the impact of minority state ownership was statistically insignificant in the 
binary logistic regression. At the same time, linear regression showed, that the minority 
ownership is also an insignificant predictor. Therefore, it is possible to conclude, that having a 
minority state stake does not influence foreign subsidiary ownership decisions in the upstream. 
Finally, an interesting observation is that control variable is a significant predictor of the 
level ownership in foreign subsidiaries, but have only a marginal influence on foreign subsidiary 
ownership (less than 0,5%). It means, that weak institutional environment is relatively less 
important for oil&gas companies when deciding on the level of participation in overseas 
projects. This result is consistent with the observation made in the first chapter on the specificity 
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of oil&gas industry – pre-determined character of hydrocarbon reserves geographical 
distribution makes companies invest in countries that possess these resources, diminishing the 
role of institutional environment. 
Further research can extend the understanding of state ownership influence in FDI 
decisions in oil&gas industry by coping with four limiting factors of this study, namely time 
period, segment of the industry, control assumption and government homogeneity policy 
assumption.  
The first one is the time frame – in this paper subsidiary ownership was examined at a one 
specified point in time (as of today), while there could be periods with different effects. 
However, this kind of research in the oil&gas industry requires an access to specialized 
databases, because there is a lack of information on the longitudinal changes (past projects) in 
subsidiary ownership in open sources. Second limitation is related to the previous one – changes 
in government policies. It was noted earlier that state authorities that exercise formal and 
informal control over SOEs might have changing preferences for EJVs or WOS in different time 
periods and among each other. Looking at the current state of affairs includes a snapshot of 
mixed results of a number of such periods. 
Subsequent studies may also take into account the differences between segments of the 
industry – upstream, midstream and downstream. This research included only projects in the 
upstream segment. Since the validity of the hypothesis was confirmed – upstream oil&gas 
sectror indeed has similar patterns of state ownership over upstream FDI decisions – the next 
step could be to investigate other segments of the industry. The rationale for the breakdown of 
research into three segments is that they have different capital intensity and associated level of 
risk. Moreover, oil companies may have strong capabilities in some, but not all of the segments, 
which influences their ownership advantages. In particular, one of the recent studies cited 
provided some evidence for sectoral specialization hypothesis, i.e. mostly upstream companies 
invest relatively more in E&P assets, while mostly downstream companies prefer investing in 
refineries, marketing and distribution assets. However, another tendency was also identified in 
the literature – oil companies strive to vertically integrate – internalize the whole value chain. 
Thus, additional research is warranted on this subject. 
Next, an important assumption of this study is that level of ownership is equal to the level 
of control of state authorities over the company. However, this is not always the case. Several 
studies, particularly on Statoil (cited in the first chapter), indicate that oil&gas companies with 
majority state ownership may have significant autonomy in making decisions. On the contrary, 
companies with minority state ownership may still be largely controlled by government entities. 
The possible reason for that is the weak institutional environment of countries, from which 
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NOCs originate – informal ties and influence is often more important than formal ownership 
level and board of directors composition. Moreover, governments in emerging markets may have 
a lot of indirect methods of influence. In-depth case studies of a smaller sample of companies 
could help investigate this subject. 
Finally, some research studies also pointed at the coopetitive nature of the government-
NOC relationship. That is, the combination of commercial and non-commercial goals is 
determined by a competition of both actors interests, as well as by their cooperation. The 
outcome is dependent on the oil&gas sector regulations, the composition of controlling entities, 
and on the extent of market reforms. This means that there should be some degree of 
heterogeneity of state influence over NOC strategic decisions, including internationalization 
process. As with the previous factors, this matter also calls for a case study method across a 
larger number of home countries to confirm the applicability of this proposition for the whole 
oil&gas industry. 
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4. Theoretical and managerial implications 
There are several ways how this paper contributes to internationalization theory and study 
of NOCs. In this section, we will first look at how the results complement previous research of 
SOE and NOC internationalization by discussing the most relevant studies limitations and how 
this paper helps to tackle them. Next, we will suggest a possible interpretation of results building 
on findings of SOE literature. In particular, it will be done through the concept of control as a 
trade-off of risk and reward – we will look at how state ownership might affect both parts of a 
deal. After that, the practical relevance of the paper will be outlined for both state and private oil 
companies executives. 
 First, it was empirically proven that government as a major shareholder exerts influence 
over the level of participation of its NOCs in foreign subsidiaries. It alters the traditional 
decision-making pattern, predicted by general theory. In particular, governments as owners 
prefer to have more control and more equity participation in their NOCs foreign upstream 
projects, than do IOCs.  
Specifically, this paper adds to the study of Ramaswamy et al. (2010) regarding SOMNC 
investment patterns in risky environments. The authors proved that state-owned companies 
prefer investing in uncertain environments because they have experience of operating there. 
Evidence from upstream oil&gas complements this pattern in that NOCs also prefer a higher 
level of control, i.e. risk in locations with weak institutional environments (given that the choice 
of FDI locations is limited for oil companies in the upstream). It means that SOMNCs prefer 
both similar institutional environment and a higher level of control in those locations. 
Next, the paper gives partial confirmation to the findings of Pan et al. (2014) – state 
ownership moderates the level of participation in foreign subsidiaries. The researchers proved 
that favorable institutional environment (strong rule of law, political stability, etc.) positively 
influences the level of subsidiary ownership, which means, that the worse the conditions are in a 
host country, the lower is the participation level. At the same time, this pattern is moderated by 
state ownership – its presence increases participation in foreign subsidiaries in risky locations. 
This paper found, that institutional environment is not a significant factor for determining the 
level of participation in foreign upstream projects, which empirically confirms propositions of 
Henderson and Ferguson (2014). The reason for that is the pre-determined allocation of 
hydrocarbon reserves, mostly in countries with weak institutions. At the same time, it was also 
confirmed that state-ownership increases participation level in projects abroad. Combining the 
last two facts it can be concluded that this paper adds to the findings of Pan et al. (2014).  
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This paper also contributes to findings of Pinto et al. (2017). The authors provided 
evidence, that state participation increases the chance that an EMNC will make full acquisition 
rather than partial in its FDI. Pinto et al. (2017) focused only on Brazilian partially state-owned 
firms, while this study contributes by providing empirical evidence to their findings on the basis 
of a multi-country sample with SOEs, as well as companies with no or partial state ownership. 
Finally, Garcia-Canal and Guillen (2008) proposed, that partial state ownership, not 
majority ownership, decreases risk aversion while investing in countries with weak institutions in 
regulated industries (natural resources, banking, etc.). In this study we found no evidence to the 
role of minority government stakes in the level of participation in foreign subsidiaries (which are 
mostly in risky locations). This may contradict the position of Garcia-Canal and Guillen. 
However, it should be noted that this argument is made with caution because the results are 
influenced by the geographical factor in the oil&gas industry. 
Second, this study provides an additional link between the literature on 
internationalization of emerging market SOMNCs and that of NOCs on a basis of empirical 
evidence. Thus, it is possible to cross-fertilize two streams of research to produce more insights 
on FDI choices. It will help to create a more comprehensive theory of internationalization. In 
particular, the three factors from SOE literature -  higher risk tolerance, more capital at hand, and 
the use of political power to facilitate favorable decision-making – are now linked to NOCs and 
can be used to provide possible interpretation of their strategic behavior abroad. 
Taking a closer look, one might suggest that majority state-owned oil companies prefer to 
have a higher share in their foreign subsidiaries as compared to privately-owned oil companies 
due to two possible reasons. These two arguments stem from the internationalization theory 
discussed in the first chapter: more share means more control, which brings more risk and 
reward. Hence, risk and reward trade-off might be the key to interpreting the identified strategic 
pattern of NOCs. The factors discussed below have other implications (e.g. increasing liability of 
foreignness), but only relevant aspects will be outlined. 
Regarding risk perception, SOEs have a different perspective on it. In particular, state 
ownership often means, that a company can have access to capital lending at below-market rates. 
Moreover, government may bail-out its SOEs in case of their bankruptcy. Even though it might 
not always be the case, state companies executives have such a perception, which influences 
their decision making. Apart from that, government may provide other types of financial 
incentives, such as tax breaks, customs fee reductions, loosening of regulations. These factors 
mean that financial reward is monitored less strictly than at POEs.  
Another factor which influences risk perception is especially relevant for upstream 
oil&gas given that the majority of hydrocarbon resources are situated in locations with weak 
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institutional environment – political backing of home country government. This means that 
NOCs are often perceived abroad as foreign policy arms of a respective state. Hurting rights of 
such a company would mean conflict with its state owner. Such a relationaship is particularly 
useful for dealing with expropriation risk, i.e. – property rights protection issue. Political backing 
also often means support in negotiations, giving access to information and even some forms of 
governmental aid to host countries in exchange for more favorable conditions for NOCs.  
Finally, risks of operating in a country with the uncertain environment are evaluated in a 
different way by NOCs due to their home country embeddedness. The latter means that the 
absolute majority of state-owned oil companies originate from emerging economies, which 
themselves have weak institutional environment. NOCs have an inherent experience of operating 
in such conditions, that can be transferred and employed in other developing countries. Taking 
together these factors – government financial and political support, as well as home country 
embeddedness may not only change the perception of risk but also the amount of risk while 
investing in foreign upstream assets. 
As for the rewards, state oil companies also could have a different measure of it. Along 
with common market measures of financial success of a foreign subsidiary, NOCs have a 
number of non-commercial goals, commonly referred to as ‘national purpose’. This purpose may 
include enhancing bilateral trade and even political relations (which is directly linked to 
government support), or exerting geopolitical power, or promoting national energy security. The 
latter is a very common goal of a number of NOCs from resource-scarce countries. Governments 
urge their oil companies to secure stable supplies of oil and gas to meet the demands of growing 
economies. As a result, obtaining explored but untapped reserves can in itself be more important 
to secure future supply, than maximizing financial return today by participating in already 
producing upstream subsidiaries. To summarize, achieving objectives that are part of ‘national 
purpose’ agenda often require having a higher control over a subsidiary, which means obtaining 
a higher share.  
From practical standpoint, this paper gave evidence to several arguments. First, 
governments use political power and capital supply to help their NOCs get favorable conditions. 
For instance, outbid competitors in oil and gas fields distribution rounds. Second, NOCs often 
possess ‘relational asset’ – ability to operate in weak institutional environment. These two 
considerations can be useful for both NOC and IOC managers. For the first group, this evidence 
can give an understanding of the best practices of cooperation between government and NOC, 
and what it can achieve while investing in foreign assets. 
For the second group, it also gives an idea about competitive capabilities of NOCs. 
Managers of private companies can be aware of non-traditional ownership advantages and devise 
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strategies how to cope with them by pressing on the weaknesses of NOCs, that possess 
characteristics of SOEs. Thus, both groups are now better informed and can prepare for the 
bargaining process, that determines which company will get a stake in valuable assets. 
To sum up, government ownership changes the level of participation in foreign 
subsidiaries of oil companies. It can be interpreted through the change in the amount and 
perception of risk, as well as the measure of reward. This study aids the previous research of 
SOE internationalization by providing additional insights from upstream oil&gas sector. 
Managers may bear in mind possible implications of state ownership on establishing foreign 
subsidiaries to devise strategies of leveraging them (for national oil company executives) or 
tackling them (for POEs executives) to their benefit. 
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Conclusion 
This paper aimed at investigating the influence of one of the most influential factors – 
state ownership – on the level of participation in foreign upstream projects. To achieve this goal, 
we looked at the deficiencies of general internationalization theory when applied at 
internalization of foreign upstream assets by national oil companies. These shortcomings were 
addressed by applying emerging market SOE internationalization theory findings, namely the 
impact of an alternative set of firm-specific advantages (cheap capital, relational asset and home 
country embeddedness), government political backing, and the pursuit of national mission on 
ownership level of foreign subsidiaries. The theory predicted, that these factors would make 
national oil companies to have a higher share in their upstream projects abroad as compared to 
privately-owned companies.  
This proposition was tested by applying two different specifications – linear and logistic 
regressions – to a sample of 441 foreign upstream project of 25 leading oil&gas companies, as 
defined by Platts ranking. The data for empirical research was collected from annual reports and 
official websites of companies in the sample. Also, consistent with the literature a control 
variable was introduced – economic freedom index as a proxy for institutional environment 
strength. The reason is that institutional environment is one of the most important factors for 
companies when deciding on the location of foreign investments. 
Results of empirical research confirmed the proposition – national oil companies indeed 
prefer a higher share in their foreign upstream projects than privately-owned oil companies. The 
possible interpretation is provided by emerging markets SOMNC literature – state companies 
measure rewards in a different way – they include non-commercial benefits in this notion. Also, 
they are more risk tolerant because of the home country government support. Apart from that, we 
found that minority state ownership is not a significant predictor of participation level in foreign 
subsidiaries. Thus, more research is required to clearly establish whether it is an insignificant 
factor alone, or interaction effects are present. Finally, institutional environment was found to be 
a negligible factor in determining the level of subsidiary ownership. It can be explained by pre-
determined geographical distribution of hydrocarbon reserves, that limits choice of oil&gas 
companies of where to invest in the upstream. Findings of this paper can be used by industry 
professionals to devise strategies of dealing with NOC specifics in regard to establishing foreign 
subsidiaries: either leveraging strengths (for state company managers), or pressing on 
weaknesses (for private-company managers).  
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